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THE CHINESE OMBUDSMAN AND
CONTROL SYSTEM t

IN

PAI-OcHUAN TAO

*

1958, Mr. Stephan Hurwitz, the Danish Parliamentary
Commissioner, wrote an article entitled The Danish Par-

liamentary Commissioner for Civil and Military Government

Administration.' It described the Danish Parliamentary
Commission as a watchdog against abuse of administrative
power. For the first time, the Danish term "Ombudsman,"
which stands for "Commissioner," was introduced to the
general body of students of political science in England and
the United States. In 1960 there was a proposal for a similar control system in Britain.2 In the United States this
system has also been seriously suggested for adoption.'
The Danish Ombudsman has broad investigatory power
and can publicly criticize governmental agencies. His position is that of a counterweight in behalf of Parliament
and private individuals against administrative and other
governmental bodies to expose publicly any of their unfair practices. Beyond this power to publicize he has
little or no real power. Conversely, he protects public
officials against unfounded accusations by only pursuing
those with merit.4
Compared with the control system of the Chinese government, however, the Danish Ombudsman is rather young,
simple, and ineffective. It is young because it was not
t This article is based on an address delivered at the Center of Asian
Studies, St. John's University, New York, in January 1965.
* The author has been a member of the Control Yuan of the Republic
of China for seventeen years.
I Hurwitz, The Danish Parliamentary Commissioner for Civil and
Military Government Administration, 1958 Pu. L. 236.
2Blom-Cooper,

3

An Omlnidsman in Britain?, 1960 PuB. L. 145.

Davis, Ombudsmen in America: Officers to Criticize Administrative

Action, 109 U. PA. L. Ray. 1057, 1058 (1961).
4 Christensen, The Danish Ombudsman, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 1100,
(1961). See also Gellhorn, The Swedish Justitieombudsinan, 75 YALE
1 (1965) ,Gellhorn, -The Ombudsman in New Zealand, 53 CALIF. L.
1155 (1965); Jagerskiold, The Swedish Ombudsman, 109 U. PA. L.
1077 (1961).

1101
L.J.
REV.
REV.

1967]

CHINESE OMBUDSMAN

until June 11, 1954, that the Danish king gave his assent
to the Parliamentary Ombudsman Act. It is simple because
the Ombudsman, appointed by the Parliament, may be dismissed at any time, and has only a small staff of a
dozen
people. It is ineffective because "the range of sanction
available to the Ombudsman is remarkably small."'
The Chinese control system has a long history dating
back to 221 B.C. The existing Republic of China Constitution proclaimed in 1947 maintains this traditional system
which is called the Control Yuan and of which I have been
a member for seventeen years. As a branch of the Parliament of the Republic of China, the Control Yuan is composed of representatives elected by Provincial and Municipal
Councils, local Councils of Mongolia and Tibet, and Chinese
citizens residing abroad. The members of the Control Yuan,
totalling one hundred and eighty, exercise such powers as
consent, impeachment, censure, auditing and correction.
This uniquely Chinese institution is an essential part of a political
tradition; and like so many other things which the Chinese have
seen fit to carry down through the ages, it has been termed "formidable and significant,' and may contain some contributions for Western politics. 6
However, this valuable Chinese institution is virtually
unknown to the rest of the world. As Professor Walker put
it,
as a result of ... language difficulties and the refusal of Western
scholars to pay much attention to political practices other than
their own, this important Chinese control institution has suffered
almost complete neglect.7
The IontroZ System Historically Inheres in Chinese
Government
In China's long history, the titles and organizations of
the officials who exercised the control power changed from
one dynasty to another. However, the nature and function
5 Christensen, supra note 4, at 1114.

6Walker, The Control System of the Chinese Government, FA EAsmm
QuA 7 mTELy 3-4 (1947).1d. at 4.
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of the control system have been maintained up to the present
time. In an edict issued by Emperor Tai-tsung of the
Ching Dynasty on the establishment of the Court of Control
in 1637, the function of the control system was described
as follows:
The Censors are to criticize straightforwardly my extravagance,
mistreatment of the loyal and the able, being indulged in hunting,
negligence of duty, demotion of the meritorious, appointment of the
unfit, or promotion of the unserviceable. If the princes neglect
their work, take property from the people without due compensation, or indulge in wine, women, or any sensual pleasure, the
Censorate shall investigate and impeach them. If the six departments or their Ministers decide things wrongly, or delay review
or trial of criminal cases, the Censors shall make them known to
me. The Censorate shall check its own members from receiving
bribery. A Censor, who takes revenge on someone by impeachment,
thus abusing his power, shall be prosecuted. But he will not be
blamed, even if what he says is not right. And what he says is
right will be adopted.8
The office of the Censorate designated as the Yu-shihta-fu, or the Imperial Censor-General, was first created
in the Chin Dynasty (221-206 B.C.) by Shili Huang Ti who
built the Great Wall. To him, both the Great Wall and the
Censorate were preventive measures to protect his kingdom.
The Great Wall was to prevent enemies from crossing the
northern border, and the Censorate was to prevent officials
from neglecting their duties.
In the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.-A.D. 221), the office of
the Yu-shih-ta-fu was raised to the same rank as that of the
prime minister, but the former's salary was only one-fifth
of that of the latter. This high-rank-and-low-salary system
was interpreted as encouraging the censor to watch, investigate and impeach the prime minister. It was understood
that the censor would take over the position of the prime
minister should the latter be removed as a result of impeachment. This old system reminds us of the two party system
in Britain, under which the duty of the loyal opposition
is to criticize the administration and take over the government after it is defeated.
8 GORSKi,

HISTORY OF THE CHING DYNAsTY (Russian ed. 1909).

1967 ]

CHINESE OMBUDSMAN

In the following dynasties, there were various changes
in the names and organizations of the Censorate. In the
Tang Dynasty (A.D. 618-916), the Censorate was composed
of three yuans or departments. The first yuan, Tai-yuan,
exercised the power of supervision and impeachment of all
public functionaries. The second, Tien-yuan, supervised the
court functions and remonstrated with the emperor. The
third, Cha-yuan, kept close watch over provincial affairs.
In the Ching Dynasty (A.D. 1644-1911), the office of
the Censorate was named Tu-cha-yuan, Court of Control.
The duties performed by the censors expanded in scope, and
the power of the Censorate was at its peak. Its tasks were
to supervise all governmental institutions with respect to
the performance of duties as well as personal conduct; to
impeach all officials not only for their unlawful activities or
conduct on the basis of irrefutable proof, but also on
suspicion; to sit at the trial of serious or state crimes; to
carry out legislative functions by advising the emperor what
should be done; to file dissenting opinions to the edicts of
the emperor; to supervise ceremonies; to audit accounts of
the Departments of Revenue and the Provinces; to keep a
close check on all government property; to superintend all
public works; and to supervise examinations.
In view of the achievements and importance demonstrated by the Censorate in its long history, it is no wonder
that this control system has been carried on to the present
time.

However, the control system of the past periods was
not without weakness or defect, the most formidable of
which was its dependence. The Censorate should have been
independent of the emperor and other officials, so that it
could have freely criticized them. But contrary to the views
of many historians, I find that it was not independent, for
the censors were appointed and removed by the emperor.
Although one emperor did warn his heirs against killing
censors, and although many censors managed to maintain
their important position as the critics of the dynasty, many
other censors were beheaded for offending the emperors,
and they were always at the mercy of the despots who
appeared from time to time. Yet, this control system has

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 41

survived to a surprising degree in China, and this for
several reasons. First, there was a tradition of courage,
dedication, integrity and honesty on the part of the censors.
Second, there was a tradition of popular support for a
courageous censor. Finally, there was the emperor's fear
of being accused of absolutism or unworthiness to exercise
the right of the "Heavenly decree," should a censor be killed
by him without justifiable reasons.
All these things are found in Confucius' teachings.
In Chapter XV of the Hsiao Ching, written between 350
and 200 B.C., Tseng Tsu spoke: "As regards this kind affection, this loving respect, this comforting of one's parents
and making their name great-all this I have learned well.
Dare I ask if a son, by obeying all of his father's commands,
can be called filial?" The Master answered: "What kind
of talk is this? What kind of talk is this? Anciently, if the
Son of Heaven had seven ministers to advise him, he would
not lose his empire, even though he were imperfect. If a
prince had five good men to counsel him, he would not lose
his country, even though he were imperfect. If a minister
had three men to remonstrate with him, he would not lose
his home, even though he were imperfect. If an officer had
one friend to correct him, he would not lose his good
name. If a father had one son to reason with him, he would
not be engulfed in moral wrong. Thus, in case of contemplated moral wrong, a son must never fail to warn his
father against it; nor must a minister fail to perform a like
service for his prince. In short, when there is question
of moral wrong, there should be correction. How can you
say that filiality consists in simply obeying a father?"9
It was Dr. Sun Yat-sen who first advocated the complete independence of the Censorate by vesting the control
power in a high, separate and elective organ of the state.
In his lecture on "The Three Principles of my People,"
Dr. Sun said,
The three governmental powers in the West have been imperfectly
applied and the three coordinate powers of ancient China led to
many abuses. If we now want to combine the best from China
9THE HsIAo CHIQNG 33

(Makra tr. 1961).
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and the best from the other countries and guard against all kinds
of abuse in the future, we must take the three Western governmental powers, add to them the old Chinese powers of examination
and censorship and make a finished wall .... Such a government
will be the most complete and the finest in the world, and a state
with such a government will indeed be of the people, by the people,
and for the people.' 0
The Nature of the Control System in Modern China
According to the 1947 Constitution of the Republic of
China, which is based on Dr. Sun's teachings, the National
Government is composed of the National Assembly, the
President and the five Yuans, namely, the Executive, the
Legislative, the Judicial, the Examination and the Control
Yuan. This unique government system stands somewhere
between the cabinet system and the presidential system of
government in the Western countries.
Article 90 stipulates: "The Control Yuan shall be the
highest control organ of the State and shall exercise the
powers of consent, impeachment, censure, and auditing."
Article 97 provides: "The Control Yuan may, on the basis
of the investigations and resolutions of its committees, propose corrective measures and forward them to the Executive
Yuan and the Ministers and Commissioners concerned,
directing their attention to effecting improvements."
Except for the power of consent, the dynastic Censorates had all the powers of impeachment, censure, auditing, and correction now vested in the Control Yuan. And
the Control Yuan also has such powers as exercised by the
dynastic Censorates mentioned above except for the sitting
at court trials. What is unique and important is the
independence on the part of the Control Yuan of the other
government branches, including the President. The members of the Control Yuan serve a term of six years and are
eligible for re-election. They are not to be removed during
their term unless recalled by their own constituencies. No
member of the Control Yuan is to be held responsible
outside the Yuan for opinions expressed or votes cast in
10 SUN YAT-SEN,

SAN MIN CHU I

357-58 Frank W. Price (1927).
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the Yuan. No member of the Control Yuan is to be arrested
or detained without the permission of the Control Yuan
except in case of flagrante delicto.
Only with these privileges can the members of the Control Yuan enjoy complete independence and freedom. The
dynastic censors under the control of the emperors apparently did not have any of these protections. Therefore, the
Chinese control system had not been complete and effective
until the Constitution was promulgated and became effective
in 1947.
The Chinese Constitution adopts some features from
the United States. The United States Senate has adopted
the principle of equal representation of the states, that
is, two senators from each state; so has the Chinese Control
Yuan, with five representatives from each province. As for
the election method, though senators are now elected directly
by the people of the individual states, yet, prior to the
seventeenth amendment, they were elected by state legislatures. Many students of political science expressed doubt
as to the merit of this change." Both the United States
Senators and the members of the -Chinese Control Yuan
serve six years. The Control Yuan, like the Senate, sets
up a certain number of committees corresponding to the
departments and commissions of the executive branch.
Consent, one of the powers exercised by the Chinese
Control Yuan, is of American origin. The Control Yuan
controls the appointment of four categories of officials, the
Presidents and Vice Presidents of both the Judicial Yuan
and the Examination Yuan, the Grand Justices, and the
members of the Examination Yuan.
(The President of
the Executive Yuan or the Premier is nominated and
appointed by the President of the Republic of China with
the consent of the Legislative Yuan. The Legislative Yuan
also exercises the consent power over the appointment of the
Auditor General of the Control Yuan.)
The United States Senate, however, controls more appointments, that is, from the appointment of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to that of postmasters. The
111

HAYNES, THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 10

(1938).

1967 ]

CHINESE OMBUDSMAN

President of the United States nominates and, by and with
the consent of the Senate, appoints federal officials. 2 With
this great power comes an inevitable evil, "the courtesy of
the Senate." That is, nominations from a given state are
not to be confirmed unless they have received the approval
of the senators of the party in power from that state. Other
senators, as a courtesy, just follow their lead in the attitude
they take toward such nominations. The most selfish phase
of the senatorial courtesy is that a senator may base his
opposition solely on a few words: "The nominee is personally obnoxious to me.""
Now let us discuss the power and practice of impeachment. The Chinese Control Yuan may impeach the President of the Republic of China and all public functionaries
in the Central Government or local governments. The
reason for impeachment can be based on neglect of duty
or violation of law. An impeachment may be instituted
upon the proposal of one or more than one member of the
Control Yuan and the decision of not less than nine other
members selected by turns. But an impeachment of the
President of the Republic of China shall not be instituted
without the proposal of not less than one-fourth of the
whole body of the members of the Control Yuan and the
resolution by the majority of the whole body of the members
of that Yuan. The impeachment of the President is presented to the National Assembly for trial. The impeachment of a public functionary is referred for trial to the
Committee on the Discipline of Public Functionaries in the
Judicial Yuan. The most severe punishment within the
jurisdiction of the Committee is dismissal or removal, while
criminal charges, if any, are subject to the jurisdiction of
courts.
In the Congress of the United States, an impeachment
is instituted by the House with the concurrence of twothirds of the members present. The Senate is the court
of trial of the impeachment. The concurrence of two-thirds
12According to HAmIS, THE AnvicE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE 399
(1953), there are 26,474 civilian positions and 98,000 military ones, totalling
124,474, subject to confirmation by the Senate.
132 HAYNES, THE SmATE OF THE UNiTe

STATES

741 (1938).
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is also required for conviction by the Senate. As a result
of this overcautious and overburdensome procedure, there
have been only twelve impeachments during the history of
Congress, and only four officials convicted. It is a sharp
contrast to the condition in the Chinese Control Yuan, by
which twenty impeachments were instituted and six officials convicted in 1964. According to Professor Haynes,
great dissatisfaction was felt with the impeachment procedure, and unsuccessful efforts were made to remedy the
difficulty by amending the Constitution. "What is the outlook for the future?" Mr. Haynes wrote: "Although thousands of civil officers may seem to be amenable to impeachment, in fact the precedents indicate a much narrower
applicability." 4
Besides consent and impeachment, the Control Yuan
exercises the power of censure. When a public functionary
violates the law or neglects duty, the Control Yuan may
impeach or censure him. A censure differs from an impeachment in two respects. First, the former may be confirmed by not less than three members of the Control Yuan,
instead of nine members. Second, the former is forwarded
to the superior of the public functionary for suspension of
his duty or other immediate necessary measures, instead of
forwarding it to the Committee on the Discipline of Public
Functionaries for punishment action.
In such a case, if the superior does not take any action
or does take some action which the Control Yuan considers
inadequate, it may impeach the public functionary in question, and then the said superior will be held responsible
if the impeached public functionary is punished by the
Discipline Committee.
The fourth power exercised by the Control Yuan is
auditing. When funds are appropriated by the Legislative
Yuan, it is the auditing process which accounts for the way
they are spent. There are two kinds of auditing: the
preaudit and the postaudit. The preaudit reviews the
expenditures of the various departments or agencies to
determine whether such expenditures have been authorized
14 Id. at 874.
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by law and the necessary money is available.
The
postaudit examines the budget statements of all government
offices and investigates illegal or dishonest financial practices. The Control Yuan bears the responsibility for both
types of audit.
The Control Yuan, however, delegates the auditing
power to its Ministry of Audit, which attends to the
following:
(1) supervision over the execution of budgets by all
government organs in the country;
(2) ratification of orders or receipt and payment
of all government organs;
(3) examination of the preliminary and final budgetary statements of all government organs;
(4) investigation of the violation of fiscal measure
or dereliction of duty on the part of any government organ in the country.
The Ministry of Audit, however, does not have such
powers as are exercised by the Government Accounting
Office of the United States, i.e, prescribing the accounting
system followed by all departments and agencies, as well as
settling of claims and vouchers, both of which are considered
in China as executive responsibility.
The Ministry of Audit is directed by the Auditor General who is nominated and, with the consent of the Legislative Yuan, appointed by the President of the State. The
Auditor General serves for a six-year term which is far
shorter than the American Comptroller General's sixteenyear term. He should, within three months after the presentation of the annual budget statement by the Executive
Yuan, complete his auditing in accordance with law and
submit an auditing report to the Legislative Yuan. But
it is the Control Yuan, not the Legislative Yuan, which
takes action against instances of misuse or illegal use of
funds.
A very important function performed by the Control
Yuan is the so-called corrective measure. The Chinese Constitution (Article 97) provides that the Control Yuan must
establish several committees corresponding to the various
ministries and commissions of the Executive Yuan to watch
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and investigate their activities. When the Control Yuan
finds a public functionary guilty or his activity unlawful
or inappropriate, it proposes a corrective measure in addition to instituting an impeachment or censure.
Corrective measures are the business of the Committee
of the Control Yuan. After being formulated by a relevant
committee, the corrective measure is forwarded to the
Executive Yuan, directing its attention to effecting improvements. Although the corrective measure is not mandatory,
the Control Yuan, backed by its power and prestige, always
gets favorable replies from the executive branch.
As a result of the effectiveness and usefulness of the
corrective measures, the Control Yuan receives every month
hundreds of complaints from the people whose rights or
interests have been allegedly injured by government administrative activities. Besides serving as a remedy, this
function also helps to prevent the administration from
abusing its power.
Conclusion
In his An Ombudsman in Britain?,Mr. L. F. Blom-Cooper
argues: "Civil servants who have daily to make decisions
would be conscious of something like the Chinese Control
Yuan (born during the Hlan Dynasty, 206 B.C.-A-D. 220),
which is a parallel branch of government, constantly looking
over their shoulders."' 5 But since, as Mr. Blom-Cooper
admits, "it is good that a civil servant should be aware
of a public watchdog over his acts. . . ,, " and since the
Control Yuan only investigates the complaints by individual
citizens and makes suggestions (which are not mandatory),
the Control Yuan is not a bloodhound but a safety valve.

15 Blom-Cooper, mpra note 2, at 148.
"I Ibid.

